Two major factors to be considered in prequalifying construction contract bidders are the likely costs and risks to be faced by the client upon award of the contract. Prequalification of too many bidders, although lowering client costs, increases risks and causes an excessive overhead on the bidding process.
INTRODUCTION
CONTRACTOR SELECTION is a crucial aspect of the construction procurement process as different contractors have different levels of cost, quality, efficiency, etc. Most clients leave the task of contractor selection to a consultant. In undertaking this task, consultants are advised not to lose sight of the client's basic requirements, ie, procuring construction work of the best quality at the lowest cost that provides the best value for money and that is built as quickly as required within budget whilst exposing clients to the minimum risk [5, pp. 232 ]. This implies that consultants select contractors who are likely to: (1) be prepared to undertake and complete the work at a competitive price (2) complete the work on time (3) construct the work to the required quality standards (4) execute the work without a significant risk of extra financial burden on the client. A contract may comprise several projects for the construction of building and/or infrastructure work. Although the term 'project' is often used in a construction context, in this paper we prefer to use the term 'contract' instead as it more correctly denotes the object of the bidding process, ie., to secure a contract. Hence the term 'contract type' relates to the intended function of the projects contained in the contract, eg., a school or hostel contract. For consistency we use the term 'contract size' to denote the monetary value of a contract (usually the lowest bid).
This aims to use the market mechanism to ensure optimal price, time, quality and risk (PTQR) for the client.
In open competition, consultants often have a good idea in advance, which of the competitors will be 'in the frame' for the contract award. This, with a need to minimise the costs of bidding, is the main motivation for the use of a closed competition.
Bidders are preselected (prequalified) on their likelihood of entering low bids, producing good quality work on time,
presenting little risk to the owner or a combination of these or other 'desirable' characteristics.
Prequalification has been defined as a process of determining a candidate's competence or ability to meet the specific requirements for a task involving a wide range of criteria for which information is often qualitative or subjective [21, pp. 169 ]. This may result in the selection of bidders who are unable or unwilling, or the non-selection of bidders who are able and willing, to fulfil the above criteria.
Time, quality and risk are most frequently assessed on the reputation of the contractor, with larger contractors often preferred to smaller contractors irrespective of the proposed contract size [4] .
In this paper we consider a more objective means of prequalifying bidders based on their previous price levels in competition -C-Competitiveness.
PREQUALIFICATION
Prequalification systems may be classified into two groups.
The first group sets out general ground rules and framework for competitive tendering irrespective of the type of contract. contractors who might enter unrealistic bids, provide a direct opportunity to decline without fear of future disqualification, and protect contractors from being awarded contracts they are not capable of performing. Also, due to reducing the number of bidders, the a priori probability of each bidder winning the contract is increased. In addition, surety companies may also benefit as prequalification should minimise the risk of contractor failure to discharge the contract.
Potential problems faced by clients using prequalification systems include inflated development costs, difficulties in developing quantifiable criteria and formalising the decision making process to make objective and sound decisions, and the possibility of higher contract prices when reducing the numbers of bidders. Potential problems for contractors include the possibility of unfair exclusion from the bidding process, and the expenditure of resources on promotion and public relations to secure an opportunity to participate in the bidding process.
Carefully structured prequalification systems for bidder selection appear to be generally under used in the construction industry. This results in (1) subjective bidder selection and 
C-COMPETITIVENESS

Degrees of competitiveness
With either open or selective tendering the contractor has a two stage decision process to make -whether to bid or not 
Optimal level of competition
It is usually assumed that the mere existence of a free market will automatically ensure competitive bidding. In the Hong Kong private sector, where selective tendering is generally used, a similar size sample contained an average of 10 bidders for each contract [4] .
As the number of bidders varies from auction to auction, bidders typically adjust their bids to reflect the level of competition [1] and several empirical studies [11, 16, 27] have found an inverse relationship between the number of bidders and the value of the lowest and/or mean bid.
An objective of prequalifying bidders is to obtain an optimal level of competition, that is obtaining the lowest bid at a minimum cost of bidding. This requires engaging the minimum number of bidders to obtain a genuine competitive bid.
At sub-optimal levels of competition, contractors or clients may suffer as a result of under-competition or over-competition.
To overcome fears of receiving higher bids as a result of reducing the number of competitors in competition, consultants have been urged to compile tender lists more carefully by choosing the most competitive bidders [22] . It has been suggested [6] that this can be done by considering contractors'
experience, performance and current workload.
Measuring competitiveness
The prequalification process should therefore try to ensure that a group of bidders is selected who will submit genuinely competitive bids. A measure of competitiveness in bidding commonly found in the literature is the percentage of each bid above the baseline, or C-Competitiveness, ie 
Competitiveness factors in bidding strategy
It has been said that long term differences between bidders' pricing are a reflection of their relative efficiencies -more efficient bidders tending to enter lower bids [7] .
Indeed, this is the basic precept of the market mechanism.
However, in a less than stable environment such as the Factors influencing competitiveness may be grouped into those affecting (1) group behaviour, (2) individual behaviour, and (3) contract characteristics (see Fig. 1 ). The degree to which these factors influence competitiveness levels is dependent on the baseline estimates and levels of mark-up emanating from the bidders' strategies or policies.
Bidding strategy is concerned with setting the mark up level to a value that is likely to provide the best pay-off. In The idea of preference and constraint driven bidders can also be related to Porter's work [19] in which he identifies three strategies;
(1) cost leadership: firm aims for the lowest cost and achieves superior profitability from an above average price margin.
(2) differentiation: firm strives to differentiate its products such that it can raise price more than the cost of differentiating and thereby achieve superior profitability.
(3) focus : firm concentrates on a particular segment of the market and applies either a cost leadership or differentiation strategy.
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Bidders who adopt a cost leadership strategy are likely to be constrained by their ability to cut costs in an attempt to achieve superior profitability rather than be selective towards certain contract characteristics. However, bidders who choose a focus strategy are likely to place a greater emphasis on preference rather than constraint.
The idea of preference and constraint driven is not directly applicable to bidders who use a differentiation strategy. These bidders are hoping to win contracts through, for example, reputation even though their bids may not be the lowest. It is worth noting that such a strategy is likely to be more successful in the private sector. This is because of public accountability in the public sector normally means that contracts have to be awarded to the lowest bidder only.
Classification of bidders
The Table 1 ). Each bidder was assigned a code to preserve identity. On average 13 bids were received for each contract.
All bidders
Using data for all the bidders in the sample, the overall mean C-Competitiveness, C', was correlated with the standard deviation, C". This produced a positive correlation coefficient of 0.614 (n=149, p=0.000) for bidders having more than one bidding attempt. As pointed out in an earlier paper [4] , the correlation of C' with C" is expected as bidders with high C' but low C" (i.e., Non-Serious) would fail to get any work.
Conversely, bidders with low C' but high C" (i.e., Suicidal)
would eventually become bankrupt. 
Most frequent bidders
The most frequent bidders, ie those who bid ten times or more in the sample, were selected for analysis as it was Bidders were then considered in terms of contract type groupings, within each classification, and tabulated according to their overall performance classification. show a mixed classification over the various contract types. In this case it could be argued that these bidders are focused. In general then it seems that this Sensible group of bidders can be regarded as lying on an unfocused-focused continuum. This corresponds to a C'-C" diagonal line running from bottom left to top right through the Sensible quadrant in Fig. 4 . Based on this model, we would therefore consider bidders 11, 75, and 178
for instance also to be unfocused cost leaders despite the lack of available direct evidence.
Of the few bidders classified as Suicidal, none are actually classed as Suicidal for individual contract types.
With one exception, they are classed as either Sensible or
Silly. This suggests that they are focused but, as implied by 
CONCLUSIONS
A major issue in prequalification is in ensuring that genuine competitive bids are likely to be received from bidders. Specialists are distinguished by their unequal distribution of successes across different contract types. Specialists who had been successful more than once for a particular contract type were found to exist for all but one of the six contract types under study.
In this paper we describe a method of identifying and classifying potential bidders' contract preferences in terms of C-Competitiveness.
In a case study of construction contract bidding, a significant positive correlation between competitiveness and consistency resulted in most bidders being classified as Silly bidders winning more than one contract for a particular type, on the other hand, could be said to do so more by luck than judgement.
Clearly, it is important to add more qualitative data to the analysis to confirm the postulated relationships between bidders' strategies and the classifications developed here.
This could best be achieved by meetings with successful and unsuccessful bidders and this is planned for the next stage of the research.
